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In November 2015, the European Union (EU) formally presented to the United States 
(US) its proposal for a new system for resolving investor-state disputes under the 
Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership (TTIP): the Investment Court System 
(ICS).1 Alongside the ongoing EU-US negotiations, the European Commission aims to 
establish an International Investment Court with the objective of replacing all investor-
state dispute-settlement (ISDS) mechanisms in EU agreements, in EU member states’ 
agreements with third countries and even in investment treaties concluded between non-
EU countries.  
 
The EU proposes a court system comparable to domestic and international courts in terms 
of its structure and composition: the ICS would be composed of a Tribunal of First 
Instance (Investment Tribunal) and an Appeal Tribunal. The Investment Tribunal would 
be composed of 15 judges appointed jointly by the EU and the US, of which five would 
be EU nationals, five US nationals and five third country nationals. The Appeal Tribunal 
would be composed of six members jointly appointed for a six-year term.2 
 
The concept of an investment court (or tribunal) is not new. The Unified Agreement for 
the Investment of Arab Capital in the Arab States (Unified Agreement)3 established an 
Arab Investment Court (AIC) over 30 years ago, with jurisdiction to settle investment 
disputes arising from the application of the Arab Investment Agreement (AIA).4 The AIC 
is composed of at least five serving judges, each with a different Arab nationality that 
must not be the same nationality as either of the parties to the dispute. 
 
While the AIC enjoys compulsory jurisdiction over disputes involving investors, member 
states and public entities, its jurisdiction nonetheless is subsidiary. Recourse to the AIC is 
only allowed if disputing parties fail to agree to submit it to conciliation or arbitration, if 
the conciliator fails to reconcile the parties or if the arbitrator(s) fail to make a ruling 
2 
within the specified period. Thus, it is possible for parties to arbitrate disputes relating to 
the AIA. 
 
The AIC renders judgments, rather than arbitral awards. Article 34 of the Unified 
Agreement provides that AIC judgments shall, “have binding force only with regard to 
the parties concerned” (Article 34(1)); “be final and not subject to appeal” (Article 34(2)); 
and “be enforceable in the state parties, where they shall be immediately enforceable in 
the same manner as a final enforceable judgment delivered by their own competent 
courts” (Article 34(3)). 
 
One commentator has suggested that “judgments rendered by the AIC have failed to 
reach the level of coherence and authority of the case law developed by international 
arbitral tribunals constituted under bilateral and multilateral investment treaties”.5 
 
Three principal lessons of immediate relevance to the ICS’ design can be drawn from this 
experience: 
 Consideration should be given either to reformulating the ICS as a system having 
subsidiary jurisdiction, i.e., either allowing the parties recourse to the ICS where 
they failed to agree to submit investment disputes to arbitration, or affording 
investors the discretion to submit disputes to arbitration or to the ICS. While, akin 
to the AIC’s experience, this is likely to reduce the ICS’ potential caseload, it 
would help ensure a smooth transition from the long-established ISDS system to 
the ICS. 
 The EU proposal purports to classify the proposed international court structure as 
a commercial arbitral process. Article 30 provides that “final awards issued 
pursuant to this Section shall be deemed to be arbitral awards and to relate to 
claims arising out of a commercial relationship or transaction”. This is highly 
questionable. The EU seems to want to have it both ways: to be perceived as 
moving away from international arbitration as a means of resolving investment 
disputes, in light of public criticisms, and yet retain one of its principle 
advantages, i.e., international enforcement under the New York Convention. The 
Unified Agreement adopts a more intellectually honest approach than the EU 
proposal. In opting for a new court system, complete with an appeal process, the 
EU ought not to dress up the resulting judgments as New York Convention 
arbitral awards. 
 It is essential for ICS judges to establish a body of coherent, credible and 
persuasive case law, if the ICS is to enjoy international legitimacy. This 
presupposes the participation of suitably qualified and well-experienced judges. 
Moreover, ICS judges should draw on the case law developed by international 
arbitral tribunals constituted under bilateral and multilateral investment treaties, 
notwithstanding misplaced public criticism of the role of such tribunals. 
 
The AIC’s experience thus should not be overlooked by the EU and the US in finalizing 
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